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Low-Level Radioactive Waste from
Nuclear Power Plants 1 I INTRODUCTION
Purpose
This appendix of DOELLW-114 Revision 1' describes various factors that influence the time at which commercial nuclear utility waste becomes available for disposal. This information is part of an overall effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) through the Greater-Than-Class C Low-Level Waste Program to estimate expected volumes and radionuclide activities for commercially generated greater-than-Class C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste (LLw)* A significant portion GTCC LLW in the U.S. will be generated by commercial nuclear power plants. Each year, operation of a nuclear power plant produces a small amount of GTCC LLW. At decommissioning, however, components within the reactor system must be disposed of according to their activity level. Decommissioning will likely yield a larger volume of GTCC LLW than will reactor operation. The total volume of waste that could be classified as GTCC is directly related to the length of time that reactor structural components have been exposed to neutron flux during plant operations. During plant operations, the metal alloys in these components will become radioactive as a result of neutron absorption. The total volume of GTCC LLW produced by each power plant is the sum of the GTCC LLW operating waste and decommissioning waste volumes. Both of these waste volumes are influenced by the operating lifetime of the power plant. Therefore, to project the volume of GTCC LLW from nuclear utilities, it is necessary to estimate the expected total operating life of each plant.
Scope
This report presents estimates of the operating lifetime of both operating and planned nuclear power plants (from 1993 to 60 years in the future) to project when commercially generated GTCC LLW could become available for disposal. Forecasts of nuclear power plant capacity and generation over the long term have been selected as the principal tool for this analysis, and are consistent with efforts by DOES Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to estimate waste generation.2 In this report, the most current projections by the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), as stated in the Annual Energy Outlook 1993,3 have been used as the primary basis to develop timing assumptions through the year 2010. Information from the 1991 National Energy Strategy: Reference 2, and EIA's World Nuclear Capacity and Fuel Cyde Requirements 19925 reports have been used to make projections through the year 2030.
The nuclear power plants studied include all operating commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the US. Projections of reactor operating 1 lifetime extend until the last light water reactor built under the current technology is shut down. Some of these nuclear power plants are still under construction or have been delayed indefinitely.
Projected power demand beyond 2010 will require the addition of many power plants.
Advanced technology nuclear power plants and new technology nuclear power plants (type yet to be determined) will be required to meet expected energy demands. This aspect is included in this study to address the potential impact on GTCC operational waste volume from these new waste generators.
This study identifies the number of nuclear power plant waste generators and projects lifetimes for the reactors. These probable reactor lifetimes are used in Reference 1 together with waste generation rates to estimate the volume of waste generated by reactor operations and at decommissioning.
Many uncertainties exist concerning the lifetime of operating and planned reactors. Some reactors have been shut down prematurely, and other reactor licenses may or may not be submitted for a 20-year operating life extension. In order to reasonably bound the range of possible operating lifetimes, this study evaluates all available information and then projects reactor operating lifetimes for high, base, and low cases.
Section 2 discusses background issues such as plant operating lifetime, current operating licenses, and possible plant life extension. Section 3 offers information on nuclear utility waste generators, including current and advanced light water reactor technology. Section 4 presents the uncertainties associated with predicting reactor lifetimes, such as operating and maintenance costs, decommissioning costs, plant extensions, and premature shutdown. Section 4 concludes by projecting high, base, and low case estimates for reactor lifetime. Section 5 summarizes the study and discusses several conclusions, and Section 6 lists the references used in this study.
BACKGROUND

Plant Operating Lifetime
Historically, the perception was that nuclear power generating plants were cheap to operate. Therefore, they were expected to operate cost-effectively until the end of their physical lives.
The physical life for a nuclear power plant was thought to be limited only by failure of a prohibitively expensive component, such as the containment building or the reactor vessel (which has a design life of well over 40 years). In theory, then, conditions within the operating license should be the primary factor that limits the lifetime of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear units whose operational life has ended for reasons other than license expiration would be considered prematurely shut down. The following two sections discuss two ways that the term of an operating license could be extended: license renewal, which would typically provide 2 to 5 years of additional operations to compensate for construction time, and plant life extension, which extends licenses 20 years beyond the current expiration date.
Current Operating Licenses
Before 1982, utilities were issued a license to operate for 40 years from the date the construction permit was issued. Depending on plant size, 2 to 5 years of that time span could have been spent in construction, leaving only 35 to 38 years of actual operation before the operating license expired. More than half of the 109 nuclear power generating units operating today were licensed in this manner.
In 1982, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began issuing operating licenses that defined the 40-year term as starting when construction activities were completed (10 CFR 50.51). With this revised process, the plants could operate 
Plant Life Extension
In 1991, the NRC established a rule (10 CFR 54) that aIlowed an applicant to extend the operating license of a nuclear power plant by 20 years. An extension would permit a nuclear power plant to operate commercially for up to 60 years before retirement and decommissioning.
For example, Comanche Peak Unit 2, which achieved commercial status in 1993, will reach the 40-year license expiration in 2033. With an extension, operation could continue until 2053 before decommissioning. -1962 1987 1988 1973 1974 1976 1976 1975 1985 1987 1984 1975 1976 1985 1986 1987 1990 1993 1974 1977 1977 1984 1985 1975 BWR (GE) PWR (CE) PWR (CE) PWR (CE) PWR (CE)
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PWR ( The National Energy Strategy, published in 1991, projected that 70% of operating nuclear power generating units would be granted life extensions (Reference 4). Two utilities submitted applications in 1992 to begin the license extension process (for the Yankee-Rowea and Monticello reactors) and'later retracted them because of Yhe endless controversy over high-and low-level radioactive waste disposal, concern about controlling operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, and uncertainty over NRC regulation."' At this date, no applications are on file for license extension. In December 1992, the NRC began a review of the existing license extension process? A utility's decision to extend the life of an operating nuclear plant will depend heavily on, refurbishment costs to prepare a unit for the extra years, in addition to the O&M costs. James Hewlett, a leading economic expert with the EIA, says "the ultimate economics of nuclear plant lifk-extension, therefore, will depend upon the extent of plant aging effects and future changes in NRC regulations."" a. In fact, Yankee Atomic Electric Co. not only decided against life extension for the Yankee Rowe reactor, but opted to shut down the reactor prematurely (before its 40-year license expiration).
NUCLEAR UTILITY WASTE GENERATORS
Current Light Water Reactor Technology
No utility has placed an order for a new light water reactor, either a BWR or PWR, in the U.S. since 1978. Many units ordered since 1971 have been canceled. The most reasonable assumption is that no new nuclear generating units, using the current technology, will be added to the current operating list beyond those under construction."
.i Operating Plants
There are currently 109 nuclear power plants, 37 BWRs and 72 PWRs, operating in this country. Forty-six units will reach the end of their 40-year life by 2015. Because many of these plants have an electrical generating capacity of less than 700 megawatts electric ( W e ) , it may not be economically feasible to extend their lives past the end of the operating licenses. They have a limited ability to produce revenue and may not be able to offset the refurbishment costs required for any extended operation. These nuclear power plants are assumed to comprise the majority of plants either experiencing early shutdown or achieving only a 40-year lifetime in the base and low cases discussed in Section 4.2.
Under Construction
Six plants, listed in Table 1 without "start" dates, are actively under construction or indefinitely delayed. Watts Bar Unit 1, still under construction, has been identified as the next most likely plant to achieve operating status. In 1993, Comanche Peak 2 was placed in service, which could extend the last date for reactor shutdown to 2053, assuming a 20-year life extension. When additional plants under construction (e.g., Watts Bar 1) are issued an operating license, the period for shutdown of the last current technology reactor will be extended beyond 2054, assuming life extension for the newest unit.
Advanced Light Water Reactor Technology
As a result of the Clinton Administration's energy goals and budget deficit reduction efforts, the review of advanced reactor designs has been narrowed to two designs. The Westinghouse AP600, a 600-MWe reactor with passive safety systems, represents the potential PWR technology for additional capacity beyond the year 2000. The General Electric (GE) 1,300-MWe advanced BWR, currently under construction in Japan, represents the other advanced design for further review by the NRC. Government funding for "first-of-a-kind engineering" has been identified in the F Y 1993 budget to ensure that these designs are available within the next several years (Reference 3).
Significantly less radiological waste is expected from these new reactor designs. Potentially, fewer core components will be classified as GTCC LLW at decommissioning as a result of a much lower neutron leakage from the core. Westinghouse predicts that vessel fluence will be about 2 x 10' ' n/cm2 for a 60-year design life, compared with a typical 5 x 10' ' n/cm2 for a 40-year life using current technology.12 Therefore, Westinghouse core barrels, which were estimated to be borderline GTCC LLW for the current technology, will probably be Class C in the advanced reactor, even with a 60-year life. Radiological waste from operating cycles will also decrease with advanced waste systems included in the GE design and similar improvements in the Westinghouse design (Reference 12).
Waste Generation Beyond 1993
The focus of this study is to identiG the number of generators producing nuclear power plant waste and to project reactor lifetimes. Waste generation rates for currently operating reactors are estimated in Appendix A-3 of Reference 1.
Current Technology
Six PWR units, in addition to the Watts Bar Unit 1 discussed previously, are identified in Table 1 as potential future waste generators. The operational dates for these units are predicted in the Energy Information Administration's Supplement to the Annual Energy Outlook 1993.13 Based on that prediction, only four or five of the seven units will be placed in service and are included in this study. Section 4 of this report further details the projected schedules for these units.
Advanced Technology
Looking ahead, a somewhat limited use of nuclear power is predicted between 1995 and 2010 to produce added electrical capacity. The Annual Energy Outlook 1993 (Reference 3) estimated a maximum of three new advanced technology plants by year 2010, a relatively negligible number.
Reference 4 predicts that significant new electrical capacity from nuclear power plants.wil1 be added after the year 2010 if certain issues are resolved. The four major issues identified are (a) a high-level radioactive waste repository available, (b) the licensing process streamlined, (c) the timeframe for bringing a new plant online shortened to provide economic advantage, and (d) cooperative agreements created between states for disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
Nuclear power generation forecasts for 2010 to 2030, produced in Reference 4 and Reference 2 are very similar. The National Energy Strategy values are slightly higher (approximately 3%) and have been selected for the high-case predictions in this study to conservatively estimate maximum GTCC LLW generation. The high case presented in the National Energy Strategy predicts that generation demand for nuclear units will nearly double from 2010 to 2030. A summary of predictions in Table C-16 of Reference 4 includes a contribution of 123 gigawatts-electric (GWe) from advanced and new technology nuclear power plants.
The electrical demand forecasts in Reference 5 are used for this study's base-case prediction.
Total demand for nuclear generated power in 2030 is projected to be 122 GWe, an increase of 19 GWe over today's nuclear-generated power level of 103 GWe.
Quantifying the number of new reactor power plants to be added is difficult because of different MWe ratings between designs. Assuming 1 GWe per plant, approximately 123 advanced or new-technology nuclear power plants would have to be added between the years of 2010 to 2030 to meet the high-case prediction, and about 80 such plants would have to be added to meet the base-case prediction. However, the volume of operational radiological waste from the advanced and new-technology nuclear power plants would be less as a result of advanced radioactive waste systems, lower neutron fluences, and more efficient maintenance activities (Reference 12).b The author estimates that reductions of 25 to 50% in GTCC LLW volume could be realized from a new plant when compared to a current technology nuclear power plant with the same megawatt output.
b. Adescription of Westinghouse's earlier APlOOO design (private communication, 1993) indicated that a 30% reduction in radioactive waste volume to be handled and disposed of would be realized because of (a) a lower number of fuel leaks, @) advanced component materials, (c) lower corrosion rates, and (d) streamlined radioactive waste processing systems.
REACTOR SHUTDOWNS
The age at which a nuclear power plant is decommissioned determines the total amount of GTCC LLW generated by plant operations and decommissioning. This section discusses the uncertainties concerning the life span of a nuclear power plant and defines three cases with assumptions used to bound the range of predicted GTCC LLW volumes from decommissioning activities.
Uncertainties
An earlier theory that nuclear plants would be capital cost-effective to build and cheap to operate has long since been abandoned. Now, utility managers must decide whether to retire a nuclear unit early, run it to the end of its current operating license, or apply for a life extension.
The decision is extremely sensitive to economic and political issues. For example, in 1992, utility management decided to retire several units early and retracted applications for life extension of two units.
Several factors influencing this decision process are discussed below, and their implications are recognized in this study: Operating and maintenance costs must remain at or near 1990 levels for a nuclear plant to maintain an economic advantage over alternative energy sources and, therefore, warrant a 40-year life.
Uncertainties in cost of plant life extension cause significant uncertainty in predicting how often this option might be pursued in the future.
Lack of availability of waste disposal facilities causes a significant increase in future O&M costs. Therefore, it is unlikely that life extension will be pursued by utilities that are already experiencing high O&M costs.
DOE recognized that the 1991 National Energy Strategy projections (Reference 4)
were too high regarding the frequency of plant life extension. A more accurate projection is presented in the 1993 Annual Energy Outlook (Reference 3).
. I Operating and Maintenance Costs
O&M costs have risen through the 1970s and 1980s to become one of the most important factors for determining the economic feasibility of continued operation of a nuclear power plant. Escalating O&M costs lend support to the argument for switching to alternative energy sources. The projected time at which decommissioning GTCC LLW becomes available changes significantly in reaction to this economic pressure. James Hewlett of EIA described the concern caused by the uncertainties associated with escalating O&M costs by saying that if operating costs continue to escalate, even with accurate decommissioning cost estimates, it is possible that a situation may arise where nuclear units would be too costly to run and, simultaneously, too costly to c10se.I~ For a nuclear plant to maintain an economic advantage over alternative energy sources, O&M costs must remain at or near 1990 levels. This situation makes it increasingly difficult for utility executives to justify continued operation of nuclear power plants to state and local regulators. Many utilities are awaiting the outcome of economic studies on O&M and decommissioning costs to plan future operations.
Plant Life Extension
Industry experts disagree on the likelihood of future plant life extensions. In the July 1992 issue of Energy Poky, James Hewlett said, "The only time nuclear plant life extension has a clear and decisive economic advantage over any alternative is in the low cost, no escalation case."15 Another source, the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, estimates that 70% of the nuclear units "still running" when their operating license comes up for renewal will be life extended (Reference 8). In contrast, predictions made two years earlier in the 1991 National Energy Strategy were that 70% of all plants operating in 1990 would achieve life extension (Reference 4). However, a survey of nuclear utility executives by NucZeonics Week in early 1994 resulted in 46% responding that they would seek life extension for their commercial nuclear power plants. 16 This response was based on today's energy economics, which rely heavily on natural gas and oil imports. Volatility in this area, as was experienced in the 1970s, could quickly change the commercial nuclear outlook and increase the life extension preduction.
The availability of waste disposal facilities is an important part of the equation for nuclear plant life extension. The additional onsite waste storage costs will increase the O&M costs, making nuclear plant life extension much less attractive.
Another factor clouding the issue of life extension is nuclear plant aging. Concern from the NRC for plant aging and safety-related maintenance has resulted in increased costs, forcing many utilities to reconsider extending the life of the nuclear plant. As mentioned previously, no utility is actively pursuing a life extension at this time.
Premature Shutdowns
In the May 1991 edition of Energy Journal, EIA expert James Hewlett points out that "it is not valid to assume a priori that a nuclear power plant will continue to operate until the end of its licensed life" (Reference 14). For example, early shutdowns occurred for three nuclear units in 1991-1992. The 1991 National Energy Strategy assumption that "all" plants will operate until the end of their 40-year life did not account for these occurrences. A variety of issues, such as demand-side management, least-cost planning, and integrated resource planning, are influencing decisions by utility management today.
Utilities now face a serious economic question. Can a plant of relatively low power and relatively low earning ability pay back, in one or two decades, all of the costs required for a license extension? Many older nuclear plants have less than 700 MWe generating capability.
Approximately 40% of nuclear plants that will reach the end of their 40-year life by 2015 fall into this category. Yankee Rowe's retirement last year is an excellent example of this situation. The utility decided that the 167-MWe generating capacity was not sufficient to pay back the refurbishment cost involved with the reactor vessel. However, the susceptibility is not limited to 13 small nuclear power plants (Le., 700 MWe or less). Last year Trojan, a 1,100-MWe P W R power plant, shut down after only 16 years of operation rather than spend $250 million replacing steam generators.
San Onofre Unit 1 is another example of the unpredictability of plant life. Special compensation for uncollected decommissioning costs was allowed by regulators, providing additional incentive to shut the unit down. Economic studies conducted for San Onofre Unit 1's "cost-effectiveness" concluded that it was profitable to operate in 27 of 32 scenarios analyzed. Still, the integrated resource planning process led to a decision to shut the unit down some 12 years before the end of its 40-year life. Currently, other nuclear power plants are carefully evaluating the benefit of continued operation (e.g., Nine Mile Point 1).
Early shutdown of nuclear power plants can have significant impact on the total volume of GTCC waste. Operational waste volume would be less than expected from a plant if fewer fuel cycles were completed. According to some industry experts, the number of nuclear power reactors experiencing early shutdown could reach 25 to 30 plants before the year ZOO0.l7
Decommissioning Costs
High decommissioning costs may represent the greatest incentive to extend power plant life. Decommissioning cost estimates have increased rapidly in the past several years. In some cases, they have doubled. Studies conducted in the late 1970s did not consider storage of high-level radioactive waste a decommissioning cost. However, without a waste repository, SAFSTOR is the only option available to a plant in early retirement. In the SAFSTOR option, nonessential plant systems are removed from service. Essential systems, required for storage of spent fuel and other waste, security, and monitoring for radiation, are required to operate for 30 to 60 years or longer before the plant is dismantled. Maintaining these essential systems substantially increases the total cost of decommissioning. As a result, unrecovered costs for decommissioning may defer decisions to shut down early, adding further uncertainty to ultimate dates of decommissioning.18
Timing for Receipt of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Reference 1 uses three cases to calculate a range of projections for the volume of GTCC L L W high, base, and low. This report provides timing assumptions for use in these three cases. The high case uses the 1991 National Energy Strategy information to define the possibility of life extension, which could move shutdown and decommissioning dates 20 years farther into the future (Reference 4). Conditions described by the high case would create a larger total volume of GTCC LLW from operations and decommissioning. The base-case assumptions and calculations are intended to represent the most probable waste generation timing using the most current projections by the EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 1993 (Reference 3). The low case establishes a lower bounding for waste volume calculations by assuming a 40-year life with no extension. The low case, which also includes the possibility of early shutdown to account for uncertainties of regulatory, political, and economic issues, presents a conservatively short projection for nuclear plant life.
Tables for timing of decommissioning waste generation are based on license expiration dates. Table 1 lists the expiration date for 40-year license periods, assuming that all licenses issued before 1982 are amended to recoup any lost construction time. The assumption for all three cases is that GTCC LLW from decommissioning will be available for disposal three years after a nuclear power plant is shut down. A summary of the projections for the three cases is provided in Table 2 of this report. The number of BWRs and PWRs in each category has been estimated by extrapolating from the ratio of operating BWRs to PWRs. This approach may slightly underestimate the early retirement number of BWRs, since, in general, BWRs have less generating power than PWRs. However, Table 2 represents the best estimates derived from all available resources to use in calculating waste generation from nuclear power plants.
If a nuclear power plant is retired early, it likely will be placed in a SAFSTOR condition until a repository is made available. However, if waste disposal sites are available, it is assumed that all utilities currently operating reactors will decontaminate the nuclear structures and systems pr~rnptly,'~ and that GTCC LLW will be available for disposal three years after reactor shutdown.
High Case
Using the Supplement to the Annual Energy Outlook 1993, the high case assumes that 114 current-technology reactors (37 BWRs and 77 PWRs) will be operating by 2005. This includes the 109 currently operating reactors, plus five out of seven reactors presently under construction and listed in Table 1 . All 114 reactors are assumed to operate at least to the end of their 40-year license to satis4 a high-growth energy demand scenario (Reference 13). The shutdown date for the last operating reactor (with life extension) is 2065, with delivery of waste in 2068. The 60-year life expectancy of most reactors is based on high availability and production rates (Le., capacity factors) of newer units?' Economically, these nuclear power plants are most For the high case, the 30% (approximately 34 plants) that will not extend life are expected to operate until the end of their 40-year life. The Trojan, San Onofre-1, and Yankee-Rowe plants are not included in this category (see Table 3 ), since they are already shut down. No other plants are assumed to shut down before completion of their 40-year life (see Table 2 ). Table 2 ). This corresponds to about 37% of all the reactors.
In the base case, demand for additional power capacity between 2010 and 2030 would also require advanced or new technology units to come on line. Reference 5 predicts a total demand of 122 GWe by the year 2030. Using a 1 GWe per plant assumption, the total number of nuclear power plants operating in the year 2030 would therefore be about 122. About 80 new technology units would be needed to supplement the 42 current technology plants assumed to be still operating in 2030 (see Table 4 ). The 80 new units would effectively produce the same amount of operational GTCC waste as 60 units of the current technology, assuming a 25% reduction in waste volume. The estimated operational GTCC waste volume from all 122 operating plants in 2030 would be approximately 90% of the volume produced in 2010.
Low Case
Like the base case, the low case also assumes that 113 current-technology reactors (37 BWRs and 76 PWRs) will be operating by 2001, including the 109 currently operating reactors, plus four out of seven reactors presently under construction and listed in Table 1 . However, prospects for life-extension are unclear. No applicants are actively engaged in the process at this time. The fact that the NRC is reviewing the Iife-extension rule leaves many unanswered questions. To account for this uncertainty, the low-case timing assumes no extension for any of the identified 113 base-case nuclear power reactors.
The low-case assumption for early shutdown is the same as for the base case, that is, 25% of reactors will shut down before the end of their 40-year license. In the low case, 40 years is the maximum expected lifetime for the remaining 75% of the plants. The last nuclear power plant will shut down in 2041, with delivery of waste expected in 2044 (see Table 2 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Under public law, DOE is responsible for disposal of all GTCC LLW. To plan waste strategy and formulate policy, the volume of GTCC LLW must be projected. The first section of this report recaps the major issues causing utilities to consider options that will affect the total volume of GTCC LLW produced. Next, advanced technology light water reactors' contribution to the waste volume is discussed. Finally, the operating lifetimes for the current technology light water reactors years are projected for the high, base, and low cases. These cases.are used elsewhere in Reference 1 to estimate the total GTCC LLW volume from nuclear power plant waste generators.
The uncertainties created by state and federal regulations, costs for decommissioning, the life-extension process, O&M, and plant aging make it difficult to predict dates for receipt of decommissioning waste and how much of the waste will exceed Class C limits. Current regulatory and economic pressures on operating nuclear plants clearly do not support the concept of nuclear power plants as national assets, as stated by James Hewlett, a leading economic export with the EIA (Reference 15). No utilities are currently pursuing operating license extension because life extension presents such an unknown economic factor. Early shutdowns are increasing as demonstrated in 1992 by the unexpected closing of two nuclear power plants. O&M costs resulting from additional required onsite waste storage may promote early retirement (SAFSTOR) for many marghally economic nuclear units. The lack of waste disposal sites is a primary factor adding to the overall uncertainty.
Advanced technology light water reactors are not predicted to be placed into service until some time around 2010 or later. Design efforts on advanced technology plants should decrease the operational waste volumes by 25-50% and eliminate major structural components from the decommissioning GTCC LLW category. The major impact of advanced or new technology power plants over the next 40 years will be in operating waste volumes. For the high and base cases, increases in electrical power demand between 2010 to 2030 will require the addition of many more of these plants. The new technology plants are assumed to either offset the decrease in operating GTCC waste volume from shutdown of current technology plants, as discussed in the base case, or increase the total volume as in the high case. The low case assumes no generation of GTCC LLW by new technology reactors.
Shutdown dates for current technology light water reactors fall into one of three categories: early shutdown, 40-year, or life extended up to 20 years beyond the 40-year date. Based on projections in Reference 3 and in other references, best estimates for each of these categories have been made to provide input assumptions for GTCC LLW volume calculations.
Eighteen nuclear plants have already been shut down. An additional 25 to 30 nuclear power plants may shut down by 2010, before the expiration of their 40-year licenses (Reference 17). Waste volumes from units experiencing early shutdown will be lower because of less operational waste and possibly fewer decommissioned reactor structural components activated to GTCC levels. The GTCC LLW volume associated with reactor decommissioning is assumed to be available for disposal three years after reactor shutdown.
